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The overarching theme of my research is the comparative analysis of practical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should intend) and theoretical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should believe, disbelieve or be agnostic about). I began this research program by offering a criterion for distinguishing between practical attitudes (like desiring and intending) and theoretical attitudes (like perceiving and believing). This yielded a novel account of direction of fit called the “two-content interpretation”, which I develop and defend in my paper, “Reconceiving Direction of Fit”, published in (2015) *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy*. My work has since evolved into two interrelated research tracks. The first research track focuses on the nature and rational topography of practical attitudes like desire and intention, and falls under the disciplinary umbrella of the philosophy of action. I hypothesize that most of the dissimilarities between practical and theoretical reasoning are closely tied to the fact that there is no practical attitude that plays a role analogous to that played by the attitude of agnosticism in the theoretical sphere. It is my desire to test this hypothesis that has spawned my second research track, which focuses on the nature and rational topography of the attitude of agnosticism, and falls under the disciplinary umbrellas of epistemology and the analytic philosophy of mind.

The first of the aforementioned research tracks has focused on three questions. (1) Do desires provide reasons in a manner analogous to theoretical attitudes like perception or belief? In my paper, “Do Desires Provide Reasons?”, published in (2016) *Philosophical Studies*, I defend a negative answer to this question. (2) What is the relationship between intending to do something and the belief that one will do it? My inquiry into this question has yielded two published papers: “Do We Need Partial Intentions?”, published in (2017) *Philosophia*, which argues that while there may be partial beliefs, we should be sceptical about the existence of partial intentions, and “Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis”, published in (2018) *Theoria*, which defends the thesis that intending to do something entails the belief that one will do it. (3) Are Desires a kind of Belief? This is the question I take up in my paper, “Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?”, published in (2019) *Analytic Philosophy*. Therein, I contend that desires should not be equated with a species of belief.

My second research track, which focuses on the attitude of agnosticism, has yielded two high profile publications thus far: “Wondering about What You Know,” published in (2018) *Analysis*, and “Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions,” published in (2019) *Disputatio*. Thanks to a few notable publications on the subject by various theorists, including the pair of papers just mentioned, interest in the topic of agnosticism has grown steadily within the last two years. This is illustrated by the inauguration of the *Suspension of Belief Project* at the University of Zurich in September 2020. The *Suspension of Belief Project*, led by Anne Meylan and Benoit Gaultier, is a four-year research program funded by the National Swiss Foundation that is dedicated to investigating the nature and role of agnostic attitudes. The quickly burgeoning

interest in the topic of agnosticism is also suggested by a large number of forthcoming peer-reviewed articles on the topic by junior scholars, including Luis Rosa, Michal Masny, and Thomas Raleigh. I take this to be strong evidence that there is both an appetite and audience for work on the subject.

Much of the recent interest in agnosticism has to do with the attitude's supposed connection to inquiry, with some theorists holding that inquiry is genuine only if accompanied by the attitude. I intend to take full advantage of the growing interest in this question in my future research. To this end, I am currently working on a monograph entitled *Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Evidence*, which is presently under consideration for a book contract at Cambridge University Press. My monograph defends the thesis that what we think of as agnosticism is actually a pair of metaphysically distinct attitudes, both of which involve a questioning or sceptical mental stance towards a proposition, and I explore the relationship between inquiry and agnostic attitudes. Given the rife debate in the area, I anticipate having to defend and develop the ideas advanced in my monograph in the face of ongoing criticism for some time to come. Additionally, following the publication of my monograph, I will be revisiting the work of comparing practical and theoretical reasoning with the insights gleaned from my in depth examination of agnosticism. Assuming that my hypothesis that most of the differences between practical and theoretical reasoning are linked to the absence of a practical analogue to agnosticism is correct, then a deeper appreciation of the rational significance of agnostic attitudes should also grant a deeper appreciation of what makes practical reasoning distinctive.